Conflict in Europe 1935-45 Handout for HTA Lecture, June 2011, at Sydney University

ANSWERING HSC EXAM QUESTIONS ON THE
“CONFLICT IN EUROPE 1935-45”
Focus: outbreak of war

By  Ken Webb

Assess the view that the collapse of collective security was responsible for the breakdown of European peace by 1939.

  • Avoid:

–        Straight narration of the events dealing with the collapse of collective security from 1935

–        Going back to 1919 in detail giving a jog trot

  • Even the best of these won’t go beyond 15/25

–        Ignoring the issue and discussing your question, eg “war had nothing to do with the collapse of CS, it was all due to Br’s appeasement policy”

  • Very dangerous, might be heading for a low result

 

  • Agree with the statement (1) – agree with the assumption in the question – gradual process

Conclusion:

The collapse of collective security was the fundamental reason for the outbreak of war in 1939.  The Japanese had proven its ineffectiveness over Manchuria in 1931.  Hitler and Mussolini quickly took advantage of its demise in the 1930s.  In the face of fascist opportunism, Britain had no alternative but to pursue appeasement which merely emboldened the dictators.  Frustrated by western weakness, Stalin was forced into the Nazi-Soviet Pact which gave Hitler the green light to attack Poland and thus place the final nail into the coffin of European peace.

  • Attempt an argument (2) – disagree with the assumption in the question -  long gone

Result: war in 1939

  • Collective security has long been dead
  • The dictators pursue policy in a kind of international vacuum
  • Br/ Fr/ R: concerns are domestic
  • War by default?

Assess the view that it was appeasement rather than the collapse of Collective security that led to the breakdown of peace by 1939.

  • Argument (1)

  • Appeasement caused the collapse of Collective Security and it was this that led to war

–        British attitude to the League/ awareness of French weakness

–        Other reasons for appeasement

–        Link appeasement and rejection of CS

–        Impact of this on G, It and SU: result war

Conclusion:

  • Appeasement led to the breakdown of peace in 1939 because:

–        It emboldened Hitler and gave him dominance over his generals

–        Left Britain (and France) with no alternative

–        Arguably forced Stalin into the Nazi-Soviet Pact

–        Which finally brought about war in September 1939

The following link takes you to Neville Chamberlain’s famous “Peace in our time” moment after the Munich Conference

  • Argument (2)

  • Appeasement was the result of the collapse of Collective Security and it was this that led to war

–        State of the League and CS by mid-1930s: explain

–        Appeasement the logical alternative (+ other reasons)

–        Impact of this on G, It and SU

–        Result war

Conclusion:

  • Appeasement was the result of the breakdown of collective security, not its cause:

–        Britain was left with no alternative

–        Pressures all round for appeasement

–        Arguably forced Stalin into the Nazi-Soviet Pact

–        Which finally brought about war in September 1939

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Nazi Germany 1933-39 Handout for June 2011 HTA Lecture at Sydney University

GERMANY 1933-39
(i) Bases of Hitler’s power
(ii) Nature of Nazi government
By Ken Webb – HTA Lectures – University of Sydney, June 2011

Some early views of Nazism

  • Hitler the “all-powerful” dictator
  • A terror state with an all-pervasive Gestapo
  • Nazi totalitarian control
  • The Nazi regime as the epitome of “typical German efficiency”
  • Nazi aims clearly set, organised and systematically put into place

The results of later research

  • Hitler the “hands-off” dictator
  • The systematic erosion of legality
  • Doubts about Nazi totalitarianism
  • The chaos, confusion, duplication and inefficiency of the Nazi regime
  • The increasing radicalisation of the Nazi regime due to its structural development

Main thrust of this lecture

  • The party and state confusion
  • The position of “Fuhrer”
  • The development of SS-police power
  • The issue of consensus
  • The nature of the Nazi government

–         end of collective decision-making

–         making “laws”

–         internal rivalry

–         power outside the government

  • A look at examination questions (if time)

The basis of “fuhrer power”

  • Hans Frank (Head of Nazi Lawyers Association):

–         “constitutional law equals the legal formulation of the historic will of the Fuhrer”

  • “charismatic authority now outweighed legal authority”
  • Ernst Rudolf Huber (constitutional expert):

–         “laws are nothing other than the expression of communal order in which people live and which derives from the Fuhrer”

  • The key word is “will”

In the lecture, I mentioned the film “Sophie Scholl: The Last Days” – highly recommened, especially for the trial scene.  I couldn’t find an English version of the trial scene but this is a link to the interrogation which is also instructive.

Assess the role of propaganda, terror and repression in the maintenance of Nazi power up to 1939.

  • Text type: assess

–         Make a judgment about the role of each, do not simply describe what each involved

  • Focus of question:

–         Role of each in maintaining Nazi power

–         Role of each in eliminating effective opposition

  • Pitfalls:

–         Watch the time frame: 1933-39, ie consolidation period as well as the longer time frame

–         Difference between repression and terror?

–         Danger of a simple chronology – this happened, then this…

  • A simple narrative account might give a maximum of only 15/ 25

–         Avoid saying: it was none of these things, it was all due to Nazi popularity

  • This “ignoring the issue of the question” approach can get you 8/ 25

 

  • Propaganda, terror and repression worked to complement each other in the maintenance of Nazi power

–         Propaganda played up the role of Hitler, the benefits of the regime and the futility of opposition

–         Repression operated to “coordinate” society and Nazify the country

–         Terror highlighted the results of defiance

  • Result: the atomisation of society and hence the maintenance of Nazi power

- The role of propaganda:

–         Goebbels and the Fuhrer Myth (Kershaw)

–         The domestic benefits of Nazi rule

  • Economic/ social/ youth/ women

–         Foreign policy successes – poll results

  • Monopoly of the media and exclusion of alternative views

 

  • The role of repression
  • Its role during the Gleischaltung period:

–         from Reichstag Fire Decree to end of the Reichsraat

–         Rabbit breeders association (Evans)

  • The more subtle, background style of repression

–         eg Gestapo surveillance

–         “doing the Gestapo’s work”

 

  • Always in the background the reality of Nazi terror

–         Organs of terror

–         The price of defiance or opposition

–         Always in the public forum

  • eg the opening of Dachau
  • Harsh reality of Nazi terror

–         After the Reichstag Fire

–         30 June 1934

–         Kristelnacht

  • Significance:

–         Who was affected?  Not many

–         The atomisation of society

Conclusion:

  • Nazi power was maintained by a shrewd combination of propaganda, terror and repression.  In the knowledge that the regime enjoyed considerable support for its social, economic and foreign policies, effective Nazi propaganda worked to convince waverers of the benefits of Nazi rule.  During the Gleischaltung period, repression quickly removed possible sources of opposition and continued behind the scenes in the years to 1939.  However, the Nazis never hid their willingness to use terror to maintain their power.  This had the effect of cowing any potential opponents and in atomising the general population.  The result was the successful maintenance of Nazi power to 1939.
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Weimar Republic: doomed from the start?

There is no such thing in history as inevitability.  Just because an event happened in the past does not mean that it was bound to happen.  History is full of imponderables and the “what if? world of counter history” makes for some great discussions.  The Weimar Republic collapsed.  Maybe that means it was meant to collapse.  However, the history of the Weimar Republic is so full of its own imponderables to make such an argument difficult to sustain.  What if Scheidemann had not declared a republic before the armistice?  What if Ebert had not gone along with the Ebert-Groener Pact?  What if a stray bullet had hit Hitler in November 1923?  And so on.

However, this does not mean that the signs for Weimar’s demise were not already apparent at the beginning of its brief existence.  Perhaps the question that should be asked is not “was Weimar doomed from the start” but “how did it manage to last as long as it did?”

Three factors stand out as long-term problems for the Weimar Republic: the failure of the revolution of December 1918/ January 1919, the Treaty of Versailles and the nature of the Weimar Constitution.  Each one of these factors would have long-term significance for the republic and each goes a long way to explain the eventual failure of democracy in Germany.

1) The failure of the Revolution of December 1918/ January 1919

At the end of 1918, Friedrich Ebert, the Social Democrat leader who found himself in charge of Germany at the end of the war, was eager for the establishment of a democratic state.  He wanted to exercise power; he did not want to see Germany face the convulsions of a full-going revolution as had happened in Russia the previous year.  To this end he was willing to do a deal with Army Commander, General Groener.  The gist of the Ebert-Groener Pact that followed was that the high command would bring the army home in an orderly manner, protect the young republic against its left-wing revolutionary enemies in return for Ebert’s putting the brakes on revolutionary socio-economic change.

When the Spartacists attempted revolution at the end of 1918 and into 1919, the army and ex-servicemen organised into the Freikorps, supported by Defence Minister Noske, brutally suppressed the attempt.  Thousands were killed, including the Spartacists’ key leading figures, Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht.  The failure of this left wing revolt ensured the survival of the Weimar Republic and Ebert’s position.  The far left in Germany would never get as close to power again.

However, it had two other key results.  Firstly, the anti-democratic democratic, conservative elites who despised the concept of a republic, and who would dearly have been happy with a return to imperial rule or perhaps military rule, remained in powerful positions of influence.  They controlled the media, education, the economy, the army, the bureaucracy and the justice system.  Throughout the 1920s, they tolerated the republic when times were good.  When times turned sour during the early 1930s, they manoeuvred to place Adolf Hitler in power.

Secondly, the far left in Germany, the KPD (Communists), never forgave the SPD of Ebert and his successors.  During the early 1930s, as the Nazis were making their move on power, a strong, united left might have been able to prevent a Nazi takeover.  However, the far left hated the SPD even more than they hated the Nazis, and arguably Hitler gained power by default.

2) The Treaty of Versailles

In September 1918, General Ludendorff handed power over to Germany’s civilian politicians.  He had not been converted to democracy; he wanted the opprobrium of surrender and acceptance of a harsh treaty to fall on the shoulders of democratic leaders, not the army.  Debate continues on the severity of the Versailles Treaty.

However, as far as most Germans were concerned, Versailles was a slave treaty, imposed on the nation by revenge-seeking Britain and France and meekly accepted by “the November Criminals” who had stabbed the German army in the back.

The Hall of Mirrors, Versailles, where the treaty was signed.

As the German historian Golo Mann put it, “Versailles hung like a millstone around the neck of the Weimar Republic”.  It provided the right with virulent anti-Republican propaganda for a decade and a half, did much to promote the popularity of the Nazis and ensured that long-term German economic strength and stability were impossible.

3) The Weimar Constitution

The Weimar Constitution which came into force in 1919 was arguably one of the most democratic constitutional documents ever constructed.  However, it contained major flaws which ultimately would prove to be the Republic’s undoing.

The proportional representation arrangements for the Reichstag (the lower house of parliament) were very democratic.  A party would have a seat in parliament for every 60 000 votes it received.  However, the end result of this set up was that no party could ever gain a majority in the Reichstag.  This ensured political instability.  Furthermore, it guaranteed lots of back room dealing and wheeling to form governments which merely served to give the impression of corrupt practice and resulted in compromises that pleased no one.

Article 48 of the constitution, known as the suicide clause, gave the President emergency powers.  Once Bruning became chancellor in March 1930, Germany came to be ruled exclusively on the basis of Article 48.  AJP Taylor argues that German democracy ended not in January 1933, but in March 1930.  The combination of a failure to achieve government majorities and the use of Article 48 made possible Von Papen’s manoeuvring amongst the conservative elites in January 1933 to have Hitler placed into power.

Communist election poster: “Betrayed by the Socialists”

www.kenwebb.com.au

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Churchill and Gallipoli: The debate continues

In the Sydney Morning Herald, 14th April 2011, Ross Cameron wrote a piece in the Sydney Morning Herald in which he tried to defend Winston’s Churchill’s involvement in the Gallipoli campaign on the grounds that Russia was developing into a constitutional monarchy.  Success in the venture, argued Cameron, might have allowed Russia to avoid the nightmare of Stalinism.  His argument was a weak one, and this was correctly pointed out by Ms Heather Carr, a correspondent to the Herald letters page the following day.

However, Ms Carr then proceeded to attack Churchill, blaming him for the debacle of Gallipoli, suggesting that his opposition to withdrawal “surely had more to do with protecting his own status than the lives of the men who were required to serve at Gallipoli.”

I cannot allow this attack on the great man to go unchallenged.  What follows is my letter to the Sydney Morning Herald in response to Ms Carr’s account.  (At the time of posting this piece, I do not know if the Herald has accepted it for publication.)

To the editor:

Heather Carr’s rejection of Ross Cameron’s argument about the development of Tsarist Russia into a constitutional monarchy is well founded.  However, her attack on Churchill is blinded by her emotional attachment to our brave Anzacs and an ignorance of the detail behind the planning and operation of the Dardanelles Campaign.

Churchill had always conceived of the campaign as a joint military-naval operation.  In this he was supported by Lloyd George who argued for sending almost 100 000 troops to Gallipoli.  Time was of the essence.  For weeks Minister of War Lord Kitchener refused to send the 29th Division even though as early as February 1915, the War Council had voted for sending troops immediately.  It was Kitchener’s vacillation which was the root cause of the failure of Gallipoli.  Fearing to question such a revered figure, Prime Minister Asquith and his government abandoned any tactical initiative or surprise that was possible and the Turks had weeks to prepare their defences.

The naval attack itself failed primarily because it was not properly executed.  Churchill tried to pressure Admiral Carden and later Vice-Admiral John De Roebeck to maintain pressure but they refused.  As Churchill told the Dardanelles Commission later: “German and Turkish officers have repeatedly stated that the naval attack would have succeeded if it had been persevered in… It is said that only three rounds a gun remained after 18th March for the heavy guns in the forts of the Narrows.”

By the time of the Gallipoli landings it was too late.  Australians seem to enjoy attacking Churchill.  Anger over our apparent desertion by Churchill in World War II should not colour our understanding of what happened in 1915.  If there is a villain at all in the story, it is surely Kitchener, not Churchill.

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Some thoughts on Nazi anti-Semitism

(This item would be of use to NSW Modern History students studying either “Germany 1918-1939” or “Conflict in Europe 1935-1945”)

In the long distant past when I was a school student, and later at university, the issue of the Holocaust did not feature in a predominant way in studies of World War II.  Textbooks tended to provide debate on the causes of the war, with some attempt to allocate responsibility.  There were chapters on the various campaigns, an examination of the Home Front and discussion of the reasons for the eventual defeat of Germany.  Almost as an afterthought, there would be an often short section dealing with the events of the Holocaust.

Fortunately this way of dealing with World War II has changed.  The History of World War II can only be studied properly by understanding the centrality of the story of the Holocaust within it.  The Nazis’ attempt to exterminate the Jewish Race was not an afterthought; it was a crucial part of their thinking during World War II and arguably the central purpose and logical outcome of Nazi ideology.  If one removes the belief in Aryan racial superiority, the central role of the Volk and deep-seated anti-Semitism, Nazi ideology ceases to have any meaning at all.

If this is true, it raises a series of questions for historians. 

  • Was the Holocaust inevitable?  Was it always the goal of the Nazis to destroy the Jewish race?
  • Was the Holocaust the result of the strains placed on the Nazi regime by the war?
  • Was the Holocaust the sole responsibility of Adolph Hitler?
  • Indeed, did Hitler actually play any role in the Holocaust?
  • To what extent can the German people be blamed for what happened?

There are no conclusive answers to any of these questions.  What follows is an attempt to provide some thoughts on these issues with occasional reference to the works of various historians.

The fundamental historical debate regarding the Holocaust (and many aspects of the Nazi period) is between those historians referred to as “intentionalists” and those referred to as “structuralists”. 

Intentionalists argue that it was the Nazi aim all along to exterminate the Jews.  From the time of Mein Kampf (1924), Hitler and his henchmen had made no secret of their contempt for Jews or their belief that there was no place for them in a Nazi Germany.  As pressure on the Jews grew throughout the 1930s, the terrible events of World War II can be seen as the horrific logic of Nazi racial policy.  In this scenario, World War II must be viewed as a racial war in which Nazi Germany was fighting for its dream of lebensraum and a future German empire free of racial inferiors and potential pollutants of the pure Aryan racial stock.

                                                                                    Gas chamber: Dachau Concentration Camp

Structuralists, on the other hand, argue that the extermination of the Jews was not the long-term Nazi goal.  They argue that the horrors of the death camps were the result of two main factors.  Firstly, due to Hitler’s lack of leadership, and his willingness to allow his  underlings to compete with each other in a quasi-Social Darwinist struggle, the Nazi regime spun out of control and became increasingly radical.  The most obvious feature of this radicalisation was the increasing extremism of anti-Semitic policies which culminated in the Holocaust.  Secondly, early Nazi successes in the war brought millions of Jews under Nazi control.  There was a practical problem of what to do with so many people.  The solution: gas them.     Crematoria: Dachau Concentration Camp

Ian Kershaw has written about the problems of the Nazi regime in the 1930s.  Hitler’s lack of leadership and his failure to give direction to his underlings, led them to try and second guess what he wanted.  Kershaw refers to this as “working towards the Fuhrer”.  Ever eager to impress the Fuhrer and to implement his ideas, Nazi leaders sought to implement what they believed the Fuhrer wanted in ever more radical ways.  The ultimate result of this was the events of the Holocaust. 

What role did Hitler play in all of this?  In a real sense, he played no role.  There is no evidence that he specifically gave orders for the gassing of the Jews.  He played no role in the construction or administration of the concentration camps.  He did not attend the Wansee Conference of January 1942 when the decision was made to seek a “final solution to the Jewish problem”.  Yet the Holocaust could not have happened without Hitler.  It was his ideas in Mein Kampf which guided the Nazi Party.  It was his obsession with the Jews which provided the bases of Nazi ideology.  Though Hitler might have been a “hands off leader”, it is inconceivable that the gassings could have occurred without his approval.  His prophetic speech of January 1939 provides an unambiguous statement of his thinking:

 If the international Jewish financiers… succeed in plunging the nations into a world war… then the result will (be)… the annihilation of the Jewish race in Europe. 

Nazi apologists and Holocaust deniers, such as the British “historian”, David Irving, have endeavoured to argue that Hitler was ignorant of the Holocaust and indeed even tried to limit anti-Jewish activity.  (For a forensic destruction of Irving’s thinking see Richard Evans’ book “Telling lies about Hitler”.)

In the mid-1990s, the American historian, Daniel Goldhagen, wrote a book called “Hitler’s Willing Executioners”.  In his work, Goldhagen argued that the events of the Holocaust cannot be blamed solely on the Nazis.  He argues that many ordinary Germans were complicit in events, indeed that they were active and willing participants.  Not surprisingly, Goldhagen earned much criticism from inside Germany. 

The internet contains thousands of sites with information relating to the Holocaust.  Some of it is excellent, some of it emanates from Holocaust deniers.  Tread wearily!  One excellent site is: http://www.holocaust-history.org/.  It contains a wealth of factual, analytical, photographic and primary source material.  (It is a Jewish funded site.)

When I was in my twenties, I read William S Shirer’s “The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich”.  I believe this is one of the best books on this period.  Its sections on the Holocaust still provide haunting reading and are excellent for students (and teachers) new to this topic.

www.kenwebb.com.au

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