By  Ken Webb

Assess the view that the collapse of collective security was responsible for the breakdown of European peace by 1939.

• Avoid:

–        Straight narration of the events dealing with the collapse of collective security from 1935

–        Going back to 1919 in detail giving a jog trot

• Even the best of these won’t go beyond 15/25

–        Ignoring the issue and discussing your question, eg “war had nothing to do with the collapse of CS, it was all due to Br’s appeasement policy”

• Very dangerous, might be heading for a low result

• Agree with the statement (1) – agree with the assumption in the question – gradual process

Conclusion:

The collapse of collective security was the fundamental reason for the outbreak of war in 1939.  The Japanese had proven its ineffectiveness over Manchuria in 1931.  Hitler and Mussolini quickly took advantage of its demise in the 1930s.  In the face of fascist opportunism, Britain had no alternative but to pursue appeasement which merely emboldened the dictators.  Frustrated by western weakness, Stalin was forced into the Nazi-Soviet Pact which gave Hitler the green light to attack Poland and thus place the final nail into the coffin of European peace.

• Attempt an argument (2) – disagree with the assumption in the question -  long gone

Result: war in 1939

• Collective security has long been dead
• The dictators pursue policy in a kind of international vacuum
• Br/ Fr/ R: concerns are domestic
• War by default?

Assess the view that it was appeasement rather than the collapse of Collective security that led to the breakdown of peace by 1939.

• Argument (1)

• Appeasement caused the collapse of Collective Security and it was this that led to war

–        British attitude to the League/ awareness of French weakness

–        Other reasons for appeasement

–        Link appeasement and rejection of CS

–        Impact of this on G, It and SU: result war

Conclusion:

• Appeasement led to the breakdown of peace in 1939 because:

–        It emboldened Hitler and gave him dominance over his generals

–        Left Britain (and France) with no alternative

–        Arguably forced Stalin into the Nazi-Soviet Pact

–        Which finally brought about war in September 1939

The following link takes you to Neville Chamberlain’s famous “Peace in our time” moment after the Munich Conference

• Argument (2)

• Appeasement was the result of the collapse of Collective Security and it was this that led to war

–        State of the League and CS by mid-1930s: explain

–        Appeasement the logical alternative (+ other reasons)

–        Impact of this on G, It and SU

–        Result war

Conclusion:

• Appeasement was the result of the breakdown of collective security, not its cause:

–        Britain was left with no alternative

–        Pressures all round for appeasement

–        Arguably forced Stalin into the Nazi-Soviet Pact

–        Which finally brought about war in September 1939

GERMANY 1933-39
(i) Bases of Hitler’s power
(ii) Nature of Nazi government
By Ken Webb – HTA Lectures – University of Sydney, June 2011

Some early views of Nazism

• Hitler the “all-powerful” dictator
• A terror state with an all-pervasive Gestapo
• Nazi totalitarian control
• The Nazi regime as the epitome of “typical German efficiency”
• Nazi aims clearly set, organised and systematically put into place

The results of later research

• Hitler the “hands-off” dictator
• The systematic erosion of legality
• Doubts about Nazi totalitarianism
• The chaos, confusion, duplication and inefficiency of the Nazi regime
• The increasing radicalisation of the Nazi regime due to its structural development

Main thrust of this lecture

• The party and state confusion
• The position of “Fuhrer”
• The development of SS-police power
• The issue of consensus
• The nature of the Nazi government

–         end of collective decision-making

–         making “laws”

–         internal rivalry

–         power outside the government

• A look at examination questions (if time)

The basis of “fuhrer power”

• Hans Frank (Head of Nazi Lawyers Association):

–         “constitutional law equals the legal formulation of the historic will of the Fuhrer”

• “charismatic authority now outweighed legal authority”
• Ernst Rudolf Huber (constitutional expert):

–         “laws are nothing other than the expression of communal order in which people live and which derives from the Fuhrer”

• The key word is “will”

In the lecture, I mentioned the film “Sophie Scholl: The Last Days” – highly recommened, especially for the trial scene.  I couldn’t find an English version of the trial scene but this is a link to the interrogation which is also instructive.

Assess the role of propaganda, terror and repression in the maintenance of Nazi power up to 1939.

• Text type: assess

–         Make a judgment about the role of each, do not simply describe what each involved

• Focus of question:

–         Role of each in maintaining Nazi power

–         Role of each in eliminating effective opposition

• Pitfalls:

–         Watch the time frame: 1933-39, ie consolidation period as well as the longer time frame

–         Difference between repression and terror?

–         Danger of a simple chronology – this happened, then this…

• A simple narrative account might give a maximum of only 15/ 25

–         Avoid saying: it was none of these things, it was all due to Nazi popularity

• This “ignoring the issue of the question” approach can get you 8/ 25

• Propaganda, terror and repression worked to complement each other in the maintenance of Nazi power

–         Propaganda played up the role of Hitler, the benefits of the regime and the futility of opposition

–         Repression operated to “coordinate” society and Nazify the country

–         Terror highlighted the results of defiance

• Result: the atomisation of society and hence the maintenance of Nazi power

- The role of propaganda:

–         Goebbels and the Fuhrer Myth (Kershaw)

–         The domestic benefits of Nazi rule

• Economic/ social/ youth/ women

–         Foreign policy successes – poll results

• Monopoly of the media and exclusion of alternative views

• The role of repression
• Its role during the Gleischaltung period:

–         from Reichstag Fire Decree to end of the Reichsraat

–         Rabbit breeders association (Evans)

• The more subtle, background style of repression

–         eg Gestapo surveillance

–         “doing the Gestapo’s work”

• Always in the background the reality of Nazi terror

–         Organs of terror

–         The price of defiance or opposition

–         Always in the public forum

• eg the opening of Dachau
• Harsh reality of Nazi terror

–         After the Reichstag Fire

–         30 June 1934

–         Kristelnacht

• Significance:

–         Who was affected?  Not many

–         The atomisation of society

Conclusion:

• Nazi power was maintained by a shrewd combination of propaganda, terror and repression.  In the knowledge that the regime enjoyed considerable support for its social, economic and foreign policies, effective Nazi propaganda worked to convince waverers of the benefits of Nazi rule.  During the Gleischaltung period, repression quickly removed possible sources of opposition and continued behind the scenes in the years to 1939.  However, the Nazis never hid their willingness to use terror to maintain their power.  This had the effect of cowing any potential opponents and in atomising the general population.  The result was the successful maintenance of Nazi power to 1939.

However, this does not mean that the signs for Weimar’s demise were not already apparent at the beginning of its brief existence.  Perhaps the question that should be asked is not “was Weimar doomed from the start” but “how did it manage to last as long as it did?”

Three factors stand out as long-term problems for the Weimar Republic: the failure of the revolution of December 1918/ January 1919, the Treaty of Versailles and the nature of the Weimar Constitution.  Each one of these factors would have long-term significance for the republic and each goes a long way to explain the eventual failure of democracy in Germany.

1) The failure of the Revolution of December 1918/ January 1919

At the end of 1918, Friedrich Ebert, the Social Democrat leader who found himself in charge of Germany at the end of the war, was eager for the establishment of a democratic state.  He wanted to exercise power; he did not want to see Germany face the convulsions of a full-going revolution as had happened in Russia the previous year.  To this end he was willing to do a deal with Army Commander, General Groener.  The gist of the Ebert-Groener Pact that followed was that the high command would bring the army home in an orderly manner, protect the young republic against its left-wing revolutionary enemies in return for Ebert’s putting the brakes on revolutionary socio-economic change.

When the Spartacists attempted revolution at the end of 1918 and into 1919, the army and ex-servicemen organised into the Freikorps, supported by Defence Minister Noske, brutally suppressed the attempt.  Thousands were killed, including the Spartacists’ key leading figures, Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht.  The failure of this left wing revolt ensured the survival of the Weimar Republic and Ebert’s position.  The far left in Germany would never get as close to power again.

However, it had two other key results.  Firstly, the anti-democratic democratic, conservative elites who despised the concept of a republic, and who would dearly have been happy with a return to imperial rule or perhaps military rule, remained in powerful positions of influence.  They controlled the media, education, the economy, the army, the bureaucracy and the justice system.  Throughout the 1920s, they tolerated the republic when times were good.  When times turned sour during the early 1930s, they manoeuvred to place Adolf Hitler in power.

Secondly, the far left in Germany, the KPD (Communists), never forgave the SPD of Ebert and his successors.  During the early 1930s, as the Nazis were making their move on power, a strong, united left might have been able to prevent a Nazi takeover.  However, the far left hated the SPD even more than they hated the Nazis, and arguably Hitler gained power by default.

2) The Treaty of Versailles

In September 1918, General Ludendorff handed power over to Germany’s civilian politicians.  He had not been converted to democracy; he wanted the opprobrium of surrender and acceptance of a harsh treaty to fall on the shoulders of democratic leaders, not the army.  Debate continues on the severity of the Versailles Treaty.

However, as far as most Germans were concerned, Versailles was a slave treaty, imposed on the nation by revenge-seeking Britain and France and meekly accepted by “the November Criminals” who had stabbed the German army in the back.

The Hall of Mirrors, Versailles, where the treaty was signed.

As the German historian Golo Mann put it, “Versailles hung like a millstone around the neck of the Weimar Republic”.  It provided the right with virulent anti-Republican propaganda for a decade and a half, did much to promote the popularity of the Nazis and ensured that long-term German economic strength and stability were impossible.

3) The Weimar Constitution

The Weimar Constitution which came into force in 1919 was arguably one of the most democratic constitutional documents ever constructed.  However, it contained major flaws which ultimately would prove to be the Republic’s undoing.

The proportional representation arrangements for the Reichstag (the lower house of parliament) were very democratic.  A party would have a seat in parliament for every 60 000 votes it received.  However, the end result of this set up was that no party could ever gain a majority in the Reichstag.  This ensured political instability.  Furthermore, it guaranteed lots of back room dealing and wheeling to form governments which merely served to give the impression of corrupt practice and resulted in compromises that pleased no one.

Article 48 of the constitution, known as the suicide clause, gave the President emergency powers.  Once Bruning became chancellor in March 1930, Germany came to be ruled exclusively on the basis of Article 48.  AJP Taylor argues that German democracy ended not in January 1933, but in March 1930.  The combination of a failure to achieve government majorities and the use of Article 48 made possible Von Papen’s manoeuvring amongst the conservative elites in January 1933 to have Hitler placed into power.

Communist election poster: “Betrayed by the Socialists”

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However, Ms Carr then proceeded to attack Churchill, blaming him for the debacle of Gallipoli, suggesting that his opposition to withdrawal “surely had more to do with protecting his own status than the lives of the men who were required to serve at Gallipoli.”

I cannot allow this attack on the great man to go unchallenged.  What follows is my letter to the Sydney Morning Herald in response to Ms Carr’s account.  (At the time of posting this piece, I do not know if the Herald has accepted it for publication.)

To the editor:

Heather Carr’s rejection of Ross Cameron’s argument about the development of Tsarist Russia into a constitutional monarchy is well founded.  However, her attack on Churchill is blinded by her emotional attachment to our brave Anzacs and an ignorance of the detail behind the planning and operation of the Dardanelles Campaign.

Churchill had always conceived of the campaign as a joint military-naval operation.  In this he was supported by Lloyd George who argued for sending almost 100 000 troops to Gallipoli.  Time was of the essence.  For weeks Minister of War Lord Kitchener refused to send the 29^th Division even though as early as February 1915, the War Council had voted for sending troops immediately.  It was Kitchener’s vacillation which was the root cause of the failure of Gallipoli.  Fearing to question such a revered figure, Prime Minister Asquith and his government abandoned any tactical initiative or surprise that was possible and the Turks had weeks to prepare their defences.

The naval attack itself failed primarily because it was not properly executed.  Churchill tried to pressure Admiral Carden and later Vice-Admiral John De Roebeck to maintain pressure but they refused.  As Churchill told the Dardanelles Commission later: “German and Turkish officers have repeatedly stated that the naval attack would have succeeded if it had been persevered in… It is said that only three rounds a gun remained after 18^th March for the heavy guns in the forts of the Narrows.”

By the time of the Gallipoli landings it was too late.  Australians seem to enjoy attacking Churchill.  Anger over our apparent desertion by Churchill in World War II should not colour our understanding of what happened in 1915.  If there is a villain at all in the story, it is surely Kitchener, not Churchill.

In the long distant past when I was a school student, and later at university, the issue of the Holocaust did not feature in a predominant way in studies of World War II.  Textbooks tended to provide debate on the causes of the war, with some attempt to allocate responsibility.  There were chapters on the various campaigns, an examination of the Home Front and discussion of the reasons for the eventual defeat of Germany.  Almost as an afterthought, there would be an often short section dealing with the events of the Holocaust.

Fortunately this way of dealing with World War II has changed.  The History of World War II can only be studied properly by understanding the centrality of the story of the Holocaust within it.  The Nazis’ attempt to exterminate the Jewish Race was not an afterthought; it was a crucial part of their thinking during World War II and arguably the central purpose and logical outcome of Nazi ideology.  If one removes the belief in Aryan racial superiority, the central role of the Volk and deep-seated anti-Semitism, Nazi ideology ceases to have any meaning at all.

If this is true, it raises a series of questions for historians. 

• Was the Holocaust inevitable?  Was it always the goal of the Nazis to destroy the Jewish race?
• Was the Holocaust the result of the strains placed on the Nazi regime by the war?
• Was the Holocaust the sole responsibility of Adolph Hitler?
• Indeed, did Hitler actually play any role in the Holocaust?
• To what extent can the German people be blamed for what happened?

There are no conclusive answers to any of these questions.  What follows is an attempt to provide some thoughts on these issues with occasional reference to the works of various historians.

The fundamental historical debate regarding the Holocaust (and many aspects of the Nazi period) is between those historians referred to as “intentionalists” and those referred to as “structuralists”. 

Intentionalists argue that it was the Nazi aim all along to exterminate the Jews.  From the time of Mein Kampf (1924), Hitler and his henchmen had made no secret of their contempt for Jews or their belief that there was no place for them in a Nazi Germany.  As pressure on the Jews grew throughout the 1930s, the terrible events of World War II can be seen as the horrific logic of Nazi racial policy.  In this scenario, World War II must be viewed as a racial war in which Nazi Germany was fighting for its dream of lebensraum and a future German empire free of racial inferiors and potential pollutants of the pure Aryan racial stock.

                                                                                    Gas chamber: Dachau Concentration Camp

Structuralists, on the other hand, argue that the extermination of the Jews was not the long-term Nazi goal.  They argue that the horrors of the death camps were the result of two main factors.  Firstly, due to Hitler’s lack of leadership, and his willingness to allow his  underlings to compete with each other in a quasi-Social Darwinist struggle, the Nazi regime spun out of control and became increasingly radical.  The most obvious feature of this radicalisation was the increasing extremism of anti-Semitic policies which culminated in the Holocaust.  Secondly, early Nazi successes in the war brought millions of Jews under Nazi control.  There was a practical problem of what to do with so many people.  The solution: gas them.     Crematoria: Dachau Concentration Camp

Ian Kershaw has written about the problems of the Nazi regime in the 1930s.  Hitler’s lack of leadership and his failure to give direction to his underlings, led them to try and second guess what he wanted.  Kershaw refers to this as “working towards the Fuhrer”.  Ever eager to impress the Fuhrer and to implement his ideas, Nazi leaders sought to implement what they believed the Fuhrer wanted in ever more radical ways.  The ultimate result of this was the events of the Holocaust. 

What role did Hitler play in all of this?  In a real sense, he played no role.  There is no evidence that he specifically gave orders for the gassing of the Jews.  He played no role in the construction or administration of the concentration camps.  He did not attend the Wansee Conference of January 1942 when the decision was made to seek a “final solution to the Jewish problem”.  Yet the Holocaust could not have happened without Hitler.  It was his ideas in Mein Kampf which guided the Nazi Party.  It was his obsession with the Jews which provided the bases of Nazi ideology.  Though Hitler might have been a “hands off leader”, it is inconceivable that the gassings could have occurred without his approval.  His prophetic speech of January 1939 provides an unambiguous statement of his thinking:

 If the international Jewish financiers… succeed in plunging the nations into a world war… then the result will (be)… the annihilation of the Jewish race in Europe. 

Nazi apologists and Holocaust deniers, such as the British “historian”, David Irving, have endeavoured to argue that Hitler was ignorant of the Holocaust and indeed even tried to limit anti-Jewish activity.  (For a forensic destruction of Irving’s thinking see Richard Evans’ book “Telling lies about Hitler”.)

In the mid-1990s, the American historian, Daniel Goldhagen, wrote a book called “Hitler’s Willing Executioners”.  In his work, Goldhagen argued that the events of the Holocaust cannot be blamed solely on the Nazis.  He argues that many ordinary Germans were complicit in events, indeed that they were active and willing participants.  Not surprisingly, Goldhagen earned much criticism from inside Germany. 

The internet contains thousands of sites with information relating to the Holocaust.  Some of it is excellent, some of it emanates from Holocaust deniers.  Tread wearily!  One excellent site is: http://www.holocaust-history.org/.  It contains a wealth of factual, analytical, photographic and primary source material.  (It is a Jewish funded site.)

When I was in my twenties, I read William S Shirer’s “The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich”.  I believe this is one of the best books on this period.  Its sections on the Holocaust still provide haunting reading and are excellent for students (and teachers) new to this topic.

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However, we should be careful not to make too much of such things.  Most democratic governments also face personality clashes, factional intrigues and they frequently rely on individuals and bodies outside of the ruling political party.  Indeed, many business firms, educational establishments and other institutions thrive on a kind of “managerial Darwinism” to get the best out of their organisations.

In his book, “The Third Reich: A New History” (Pan, London, 2003), Michael Burleigh argues the following:

…In other words what has been increasingly elevated into the explanatory master-key of Nazi rule, namely the mutually radicalising effects of competing agencies, may be both insufficient, and less remarkable, as an explanation for the single-mindedness with which the Nazis went about realising their ideological goals.  If what is said to be uniquely characteristic of Nazism also typifies many other modern governments and organisations, then this alone can hardly explain a regime of rare destructiveness.  The massive documentary evidence of endless squabbles within the regime proves little, since consensus, like happiness in love, requires no written expression… (pp 156-157)

Burleigh argues instead that the key element in the make-up of the Nazi regime, the factor that ensured totalitarian rule and which made possible the regime’s single-minded pursuit of its racist, ideological agenda, was the “supercession of the rule of law by arbitrary police terror.”  Burleigh’s key point is that:

…It was not a side-issue, which once unaccountably preoccupied an older generation of historians and is now best left to legal historians, but the most important departure from civilised values engineered by the Nazi government… (p 157)

Within the Nazi regime, there was an utter disdain for the rule of law.  Murderers of Weimar political figures were amnestied while the killer of Walter Rathenau, Germany’s (Jewish) Foreign Minister, murdered in 1922, was commemorated to the level of a state occasion.  The “Law Concerning Measures for the Defence of the State” (3 July, 1934) legalised the murders that took place during the 30 June 1934, “The Night of the Long Knives”.  Hitler justified the killings and the law by arguing:

…in that hour, I was responsible for the fate of the German nation and was thus the Supreme Judge of the German Volk…

Law was a means to an end, not a value in itself.  Courts functioned openly to advertise the regime’s values but they were increasingly marginalised by the Gestapo and the SS.  Judges were encouraged to be flexible when making judgments.  Judges were expected to “abandon impartial objectivity”, to “grasp the essence of a case”, to approach each case with a “healthy prejudice” in line with “the main principles of the Fuhrer’s government”.

Lawyers and state prosecutors were expected to practise “unanimity of aim”.  Defence lawyers rarely challenged the facts of a case.  They were expected to only uphold their client’s interests, provided those of the national community were not harmed.  This became the essence of law in Nazi Germany.  Its purpose was to “protect and serve the collective interests of the national community rather than to defend the rights of the individual”.  The National Community was defined by race.  Crime was seen as an act of betrayal of the National Community and thus all crime was potentially political.

Nazi legal creativity knew few limits.  In November 1933, the “Law against Dangerous Habitual Criminals and Measures for their Detention and Improvement” combined the right of the state to hand down punishments for a particular crime with the right of the national community to be protected from potential offenders.  Judges could now objectively decide that a sex offender should be sterilised, or that an offender who had served his or her time should be subjected to additional detention.  Racial issues were always at the root of any Nazi policy making.  Burleigh sees this is the practice of Nazi justice.  He concludes on this point:

…Law and policing became branches of epidemiology, a means of excluding racial aliens or redefining crime as illness, which was frequently regarded as untreatable… (pp 166-7)

A whole range of new courts were introduced by the Nazis.  There were Hereditary Courts, Health Courts, Extraordinary Courts, the People’s Court.  By 1938, there were over seventy Special Courts.  There was a court for Jehovah’s Witnesses and special courts for clergy.  As the clergy bowed out of making political comments, they were now routinely accused of crimes ranging from currency violations to sexual offences.  There were show trials of clergy held in Koblenz and Munich.

One of key foundations of a democracy is an independent judiciary, above politics and free from political control and influence.  Equally, one of the main elements of a totalitarian regime is the total subjection of the judiciary and legal process to the will of the leader and the ideological demands of the party.

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Andrew Roberts concludes his book, “The Storm of War” (Penguin 2009), with an excellent chapter entitled “Conclusion: Why did the Axis lose the Second World War?” In this chapter (pp578-608), Roberts analyses the various factors which contributed to the defeat of the Axis powers, ranging from Hitler’s disagreements with his generals, the struggle on the Eastern Front, allied leadership to the contribution of the Americans.  The various factors are carefully analysed in a most readable fashion.

However, Roberts’ most interesting conclusion focuses on the significance of the role of Nazi ideology in the eventual defeat of the Germans.  Roberts attempts to divorce a discussion of the holocaust from the moral perspective and to discuss it in purely military terms.  He argues that the Nazís’ manic preoccupation with killing Europe’s Jews tied up valuable railway rolling stock, denied Germany millions of slave workers, wasted the time of SS troops who could have been at the front, and he even makes the point that some of Germany’s top scientists were at Los Alamos working against him rather than inside Germany furthering the development of a Nazi atomic bomb.

Roberts concludes that despite the importance of other factors, ideology both took Hitler to war and caused his defeat.  The Nazis’ ideology had at its essence the twin issues of lebensraum and race.  This meant that eastward expansion was the raison d’être of the Nazi movement.  The invasion of Poland in 1939 was not an error of judgment but an inevitable and impatient impulse on Hitler’s part.  Hitler had never wavered from his desire for eastern expansion from the turgid pages of Mein Kampf to his foreign policy moves in the 1930s.  The invasion of Russia in 1941 was thus, not a strategic error of monumental proportions – though, of course, it was just that – but an inevitable consequence of Nazi ideology.

The issue of what to do with the Jews became a prime preoccupation once the invasion of Russia was underway.  “Intentionalist” historians argue that the holocaust was always Hitler’s long-term goal, while “structuralist” historians suggest that the extremes of war radicalised the Nazi regime.  No matter which view is accurate, Roberts concludes that the Nazi obsession with race ultimately brought down the Axis.

Roberts’ final paragraph (p 608) sums up his argument:

Analyses of Hitler’s defeat have tended to portray him as a strategic imbecile – ‘Corporal Hitler ‘- or otherwise as a madman, but these explanations are clearly not enough.  The real reason why Hitler lost the Second World War was exactly the same one that caused him to unleash it in the first place: he was a Nazi.

(My book “Conflict in Europe 1935-1945″ contains an analysis of the reasons for the Axis defeat.  It has been updated into a 2nd Edition, available from March 2011.)

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President Ebert

Parliamentary democracy not communist revolution was his goal.  Ebert was willing to make many compromises to achieve this, some of which would return to haunt the democracy in years to come.

Soon after assuming power, he received a telephone call from the head of the German General Staff, General Groener.  Groener was eager for the troops to return home in an orderly fashion and for Germany to avoid the socialist revolution that had occurred in Russia a year earlier.  He promised Ebert army support against left-wing revolutionaries in return for the brakes being put on the revolution.  In Ebert, he had an eager partner.

Hence was born the Ebert-Groener Pact which would make possible the suppression of the left-wing Spartacist (Communist) Revolution of late 1918/ early 1919.  Ebert and the democratic Weimar Republic survived but at the cost of leaving the old imperial army untouched.

Richard Evans makes the point:

“His concern for a smooth transition from war to peace led him to collaborate closely with the army without demanding any changes in its fiercely monarchist and ultra-conservative officer corps, which he was certainly in a position to do in 1918-19.”

In years to come the army would develop into “a state within a state”, often acting independently of the republican politicians.  The army would come to play a key role in weakening the democracy during the later years of the Republic.  In June 1934, it would throw its weight behind Hitler during “The Night of the Long Knives”, Hitler’s final act in the consolidation of his power.

Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution allowed the President to rule by decree and to use the army to restore law and order.  Ebert used the power of Article 48 on 136 occasions.  Ebert issued decrees to remove democratically elected state governments.  He even issued a backdated decree which made legal a series of summary executions that had been carried out during the early violent years of the Republic.  Ebert’s justification was that he was safeguarding the Republic during dangerous times.

However, his powers were invariably used against threats to the Republic from the left, not the right.  Indeed, the army was eager to act against the left, as seen in January 1919.  However, right-wing threats to the Republic, eg the Kapp Putsch of March 1920 were ignored.  Some of Kapp’s supporters were serving and former members of the army.  The Chief of the Army Command, General Hans von Seeckt stated at the time:

“Reichswehr (army) do not fire upon Reichswehr.”

Clearly, the democratic republic could not count upon the loyalty of the army.

The historian, Richard Evans, comments on Ebert’s use of Article 48:

“…Article 48 included no proper provisions for the ultimate reassertion of power by the legislature… and Ebert used it not just for emergencies but also in non-emergency situations where steering legislation through the Reichstag would have been too difficult.  In the end, Ebert’s excessive use, and occasional misuse of the Article widened its application to a point where it became a potential threat to democratic institutions.”

Evans also comments on the constant attacks that Ebert had to face from the anti-democratic right wing German press and lack of support he received from the anti-democratic right wing legal system.  An unflattering photograph of the podgy Ebert, wearing only bathers, was given wide publicity and made him a figure of ridicule.  Newspapers tried to link him to financial scandals.  Ebert issued 173 libel suits against such accusations and not once did he receive justice.  In one case, Ebert was accused of being a traitor to Germany.  The court case that followed fined Ebert’s accuser only ten marks, because it concluded that Ebert had been a traitor when he made contact with striking munitions workers in 1918.

The constant attacks on Ebert from the political right reduced the prestige of the office of President, weakened the Republic and eventually broke Ebert himself.  He was worn down physically and mentally. In February 1925, while trying to clear his name from yet more smears, Ebert took no notice of an emerging ruptured appendix.  He died on 28 February 1925, aged 54. 

(References to Richard Evans come from his book The Coming of the Third Reich, Penguin, London, 2003)

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